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ABSTRACT Building trust relationships between different decentralized entities in the IoT ecosystem is
essential. Hereof, the combination of blockchain technology and trust evaluation techniques is recently
considered as an efficient measure. However, both technologies within the IoT are still facing some
limitations which are addressed in this research. First, this publication reviews various blockchain-based
trust approaches and depicts their strengths and limitations regarding their usage in decentralized IoT
communities. Then, an optimized trust model with a multi-layer adaptive and trust-based weighting system
is proposed. Additionally, different trust metric parameters and their mathematical models used for trust
evaluation are presented. Moreover, this publication presents a novel approach for incentivization processes
in the IoT marketplace using control loops and smart contracts. Thereby, participants are motivated to
continuously improve their behavior. Finally, the proposed trust model is proved to be reliable. The
experimental results conducted from different scenarios show that the presented approach provides more
resiliency against various attacks than existing ones.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, Internet of Things, services, trust, smart contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The traditional IoT ecosystem for service provision relies on
commercial service providers which create IoT services for
specific business processes running in centralized infrastruc-
tures. The integration of end-users in the service provision
process enables flexibility, decentralization, service variety
and energy efficiency in the marketplace. Local resources
have a high potential to support smart environments for
other service consumers in the IoT ecosystem [1]. How-
ever, the lack of centralized coordination and the presence
of inexperienced end-users acting as service providers are
associated with minimal trustworthiness between entities in
a decentralized IoT ecosystem. This has a negative impact
on the overall security of the network and a countermeasure
against this bottleneck is the design of trust management
systems. The ITU-T [2] also highlights the necessity of trust
for ICT infrastructures and services.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Hong-Ning Dai .
The literature provides a considerable amount of publi-
cations [3]–[5] dealing with trust management systems in
different domains (IoT, WMN (Wireless Mesh Networks),
MANET (Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks), VANET (Vehicular
Ad-Hoc Networks), P2P (Peer to Peer) Networks). How-
ever, traditional approaches suffer from a low decentral-
ization level of their trust systems, missing initial trust
score evaluations, insecure trust data storage and uncomplete
trust models. The blockchain technology provides conve-
nient optimization elements in order to overcome trust and
data integrity issues. Recently, the blockchain technology
has also attracted researchers to integrate its features in trust
management processes within IoT. However, the blockchain
technology in its current form is not suitable to be integrated
into IoT systems due to security issues, such as the overall
trustworthiness of the participating nodes. Moreover, limi-
tations regarding the consensus-building within the network
should be optimized and adapted to the specifications of the
IoT community. Furthermore, decentralized issues should be
considered, and trust-building processes bemergedwithin the
blockchain processes in order to maximize the benefits of
using blockchain.
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B. MOTIVATION AND KEY CONTRIBUTIONS
The security limitations of decentralized IoT service provi-
sion approaches, the deficits of existing trust management
systems and several challenges for blockchain integration in
IoT highlights the importance to design an optimized frame-
work. Previous works have initially addressed issues, such
as the lack of trust in end-user based IoT ecosystem [18],
by providing a decentralized approach for trust evaluation.
The authors in [19], [20] provide an optimized trust frame-
work where blockchain is integrated for integrity reasons.
Moreover, they optimize the consensus methods used by the
participants in the blockchain network. However, they do not
consider an incentivization system to motivate low trusted
peers to increase positively their performance. Furthermore,
the works in [18]–[20] lack details on the trust metric param-
eters and the mathematical model. Additionally, they do not
present a trust aggregation scheme for the gathered trust infor-
mation. Finally, prior works do not highlight the performance
of the trust model in relation to others.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1. Reviews recently published blockchain-based trust
approaches in the IoT field which aim to benefit from the
blockchain technology. The review consists of the defini-
tion of several criteria relevant for the assessment based
on the characteristics of decentralized IoT ecosystems.
2. Proposes an optimized and blockchain-based trust
approach considering strengths and limitations derived
from the related work and covering several relevant
trust aspects in IoT. Moreover, this publication presents
a blockchain-based trust evaluation process using a
lightweight and trust-based consensus protocol for deci-
sion making in the P2P network.
3. Presents different trustmetrics and accordingly describes
their mathematical models used for further trust
computations.
4. Presents a multilayer weighting system combined with
blockchain principles to aggregate the overall trust score
of peers in fully decentralized IoT marketplaces.
5. Introduces conceptionally a novel concept of combining
control loops, blockchain and trust to motivate good
participation of service providers in the network. In order
to realize the incentivization process using control loops,
smart contracts are integrated.
6. Evaluates the proposed holistic trust model by highlight-
ing its resiliency against trust attacks and by showing its
strengths in contrast to other existing models.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
This publication is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
a review of blockchain-based trust approaches in IoT and
summarizes challenges for an ideal trust management sys-
tem considering the different characteristics of decentral-
ized IoT networks and the special nature of end-user-based
environments. Section 3 presents an optimized trust model
for evaluating the trustworthiness of IoT services. More-
over, it defines the mathematical model of all trust metrics
and their corresponding sub-metrics used for trust evalua-
tion. Additionally, it presents a novel concept to combine
blockchain, trust and control loops to optimize the overall
trust in the IoT marketplace. Section 4 introduces the integra-
tion of blockchain for trust data storage and trust evaluation.
Furthermore, it presents a novel multi-layer and trust-based
weighting system to increase the trustworthiness of the trust
model. Finally, section 5 shows the experimental results of
the proposed trust model against several attacks.
II. CHALLENGES FOR A TRUSTED AND
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. BLOCKCHAIN IN DIFFERENT APPLICATION FIELDS
Blockchain has now gained much attention in the academia
and industry and its integration in different applications is
increasing permanently. The diversity of blockchain publi-
cations enrich different sectors, such as healthcare, finance,
energy, media telecommunication, Internet of Things [52].
For instance, approaches in the healthcare sector try to opti-
mize data security [33] and authentication schemes [34]
for electronic health records. Other authors propose to
integrate the blockchain technology in the energy sector
in order to enable decentralized electricity load verifica-
tion, decentralized energy marketplace, P2P energy load
management or energy consumption reporting [35], [36].
Blockchain is also introduced to support processes in Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) [37] or P2P applications [38]. Dif-
ferent blockchain-based approaches aiming to benefit from
its tamper-proof and decentralization feature are also present
in the field of VANETs [39], [40]. Some other authors
dealt with scalability issues and resource constraints when
implementing blockchain in IoT devices by proposing an
optimized blockchain framework with a light-weight con-
sensus method [49], [50]. Others integrate blockchain to
mitigate security issues and problems with centralized enti-
ties in Federated Learning processes (a cooperative approach
to distributed learning) [51]. The powerful combination of
blockchain and smart contracts (self-executing codes) within
IoT is highlighted in [31], [32], [57], [58]. Several researchers
propose approaches to optimize data integrity [41]–[43] or
the access control systems [44]–[46] in IoT networks. In the
context of IoT, specifically in the Industrial IoT, different
blockchain-based approaches are also present [47], [48], [56].
The following subsection presents a review of relevant
blockchain-based trust approaches in IoT.
B. REVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TRUST
APPROACHES IN IOT
One of the key limitations of traditional trust management
approaches is the insecure data storage leading to unreliable
trust information about peers in a network. Trust information
used to build trust relationships among peers can be manip-
ulated and misused by malicious peers. Another problem
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is the missing leader or centralized entity for coordinating
several decision-making processes in the community. How-
ever, a centralized component should be avoided to limit
autocracy behavior in a network and to overcome single-
point-of-failure issues. To overcome this, the blockchain
technology provides the possibility through cryptographic
principles and related consensus protocols to securely store
information in its ledgers and thus to increase the integrity
level of that information. Smart contracts in combination with
blockchain enable the automation of processes in a network
without the need of a coordinator. The benefits of these
technologies and their integration for decentralizedM2M/IoT
services are initially introduced by the authors of this pub-
lication in [6]. The combination of blockchain technology
and trust management systems to enhance the overall privacy,
security and trust level is introduced in different applica-
tion fields such as in P2P networks [26], Vehicular Net-
works [25], [27], MANETs [30], Robotics [28], Autonomous
Systems [29]. Some surveys, such as in [9] reviewed several
existing blockchain-based approaches introduced within that
domains. However, recently published publications aiming
to integrate blockchain for trust management optimization in
IoT are not addressed. In the following, themost relevant trust
approaches are reviewed concluding with their strengths and
limitations for using them in decentralized IoT communities.
A blockchain-based trust system was proposed in [10],
where the lack of trust between different IoT domains is
identified. Every domain has its own manufacturer, which
creates a root of trust suitable only for devices within the
single domain to communicate securely. The authors in [10]
introduced initially a distributed credit-like system (using
a platform called obligation chain) including a reputation
mechanism which enables every service provider to accept
or decline obligations of service consumers. The obligation
chain is a distributed ledger used to store signed obliga-
tions (done outside the chain) between service providers
and service consumers. To protect against malicious nodes,
the authors propose to use so-called proof of commitments
for service providers and proof of fulfilments for service
consumers, which are using the information regarding obli-
gations and fulfilments stored in the distributed ledger. The
cooperation between a service provider and consumer is done
by exchanging terms of use (created by service providers)
and obligations (defined by consumers). The authors used
a combination of their introduced obligation chain and the
standard bitcoin blockchain to access the credibility of the
obligation issuer. On top of the obligation chain, a three-
way handshaking protocol is proposed to bridge trust between
different domains. This protocol consists of the setup, spend,
and fulfilling phase, using information stored in the dis-
tributed ledger to handle service handlings between ser-
vice providers and service consumers. Reputation scores of
service consumers are stored in the distributed ledger and
evaluated locally (by every service provider when required)
based on the average obligations fulfilled on time by the
consumer.
Similarly, the authors in [11] presented a blockchain-based
trust management system to evaluate the trustworthiness of
devices and to securely store and share trust information in the
blockchain via transactions. The proposed system relies on a
network model with different manufacturing zones contain-
ing physical resources such as IoT devices, an authenticator
acting as authorization entity, a trust manager managing and
evaluating the trustworthiness of the zone members, miners
collecting trust information in a block, broadcasting them and
verifying other blocks. For trust evaluation, the authors are
using direct observations of the packet delivery behavior and
recommendations from other nodes. Specifically, the entities
cooperativeness, competence, community of interest and the
credibility toward recommendations are used as trust metrics.
For blockchain activities, the authors propose to use a private
blockchain called multichain using a round-robin algorithm
for approving transactions minimizing complex computation
resources. The trust computation of the trust manager will
also consider the experience scores computed from devices
based on their communication with direct neighbors.
The authors in [12] propose a blockchain-based approach
combined with smart contracts to evaluate the trust of IoT
devices. The authors propose to use smart contracts to set
endorsement policies for new transactions. Thus, after a
transaction is proposed by a client (IoT device), other nodes
called endorsing peers, will evaluate them concluding with
the acceptance or rejection of the transaction. Transactions
with chain code are only accepted if the trust score of par-
ticipants is high enough. Blockchain activities are done by
peer nodes considered as trustworthy. Only authorized clients
can join the blockchain networks (permissioned) and the
participants are assigned with trust points which are updated
based on rating resulting from interactions between two par-
ticipants. Interactions between two nodes are enabled using
smart contracts which check the trust points in relation to the
thresholds. Balance of trust points is stored in the blockchain.
The authors refer to trust evaluations in two cases. Trust
evaluation using Packet Delivery Rate as trust indicator and
performed directly after each interaction between two partici-
pants and trust evaluation done by the blockchain nodes after
a peer initiates a transaction proposal (seems more to be a
trust checking smart contract).
The authors in [13] present a dynamic trust evaluation sys-
tem which uses a consortium blockchain to track interactions
among supply chain participants. The trust score is assigned
based on these transactions and has a special focus on this
trust data. Therefore, raw data including supply chain data
(produced by sensor devices), trade events between entities,
and regulatory endorsements are stored off the chain. Their
hash values are sent to the blockchain via transactions which
trigger smart contracts to automatically calculate trust and
reputation scores based on the provided data.
The blockchain is used among others to store the hashes
of the supply chain data and the digital profiles of all entities
(containing the trust information). Smart contracts are also
used to include quality assessments between the participants
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to incentivize participants to contribute trustworthily. Entities
joining for the first time the network (without past reputa-
tion), will be assigned with a minimum trust score by default.
The authors in [13] state that the overall trust score of an
entity is calculated based on the overall reputation score
and some other feature scores (e.g. consumer feedback) and
the weighting factors for the trust evaluation are determined
by the business network administrator which also manages
the blockchain network and defines the business network
model.
The authors in [14] introduce a trust management architec-
ture where trust values of service providers are stored in the
blockchain. The system architecture proposed in [14] consists
of one layer with distributed IoT devices providing services
to each other and a second layer with distributed fog nodes
which are responsible for the management and control of
IoT objects. The fog nodes also maintain a blockchain which
is used by the IoT devices to store trust information in it.
The transactions in the blockchain are validated by the fog
nodes using the Proof of Stake (PoS) Algorithm. The trust
model used in [14] to evaluate the trust level of IoT objects
considers only honest IoT devices for reporting recommen-
dations (based on the interaction experience) about other IoT
service providers sending to its managing fog (home fog
node). Interaction experience means the recommendation of
an IoT device toward other IoT service providers regarding
a used service. The transactions containing trust information
are sent by the home fog node to other fog nodes part of
the blockchain for validation (which are using the Proof of
Stack algorithm for consensus). A Distributed Hash Table is
used to store information about available services provided
by potential service providers.
The authors in [15] propose a blockchain-based approach
for improving end-to-end trust in different IoT applications.
Therefore, they introduce a layered trust architecture for IoT
blockchain where trust is considered for data observation
and blockchain validation. Data observation includes data
from different sources such as from IoT devices where the
hash values of these data are stored off-the-chain and in the
blockchain (via transactions) for integrity reasons. For trust
management, the authors introduce a data trust module and a
gateway reputation module. While the data trust module eval-
uates the trustworthiness of observation data based on behav-
ioral information of the data source and related information
from other sources, the reputationmodule provides reputation
information about participants to the blockchain and to the
application layer. The presented trust model in [15] relies
mainly on the confidence of the observations taken between
the nodes, the confidence of the data sources, the reputation of
data sources, and the evidence taken from other observations.
The gateway nodes participate in block generation, validation
and distributed consensus in the private blockchain network
where only nodes with permission can participate and no
competition for block generation among them is required.
Based on the information included in blockchain transactions
the gateway nodes (are selected periodically) calculate the
evidence and the sensor reputations to assign trust values
for the sensor observations. The generated block includes
transactions containing observation data, public key and sig-
nature of data sources, assigned trust value for the observation
and the updated reputation of the data source. Furthermore,
the authors propose a reputation-based block validation by
considering validations of data stored in the blockchain with
data provided by nodes and the reputation scores of block
generating nodes.
In addition, the authors in [16] propose to use a behavior
monitor system in IoT-blockchain infrastructures that can
store IoT device data and classifies normal or malicious
behavior based on these data. Their system model considers
different declared IoT-zones used for different IoT use-cases
where each zone has its local blockchain network used to
store all kind of communications between devices in the
form of blockchain transactions. Every zone has its master
node selected based on the resource capability and used for
main blockchain activities, such as for creating new blocks.
Moreover, the master node centrally processes all incoming
and outgoing transactions to and from a zone. The authors
propose a behavior monitor for each zone (configured on the
master node) which classifies the behavior of every device
and compute a level of trust on each zone using learning
neural networks such as deep auto-encoders.
The authors in [17] present a blockchain-based trust eval-
uation for IoT devices (with focus on the home network),
where reported histories stored in a blockchain are used to
compute the trust scores for each class of devices. Initially,
the authors propose to isolate groups of devices in network
slices using their own defined SDN-based home controller.
Through a simplified risk assessment scale, users are able
to assign desired trust levels to those isolated slices. The
controllers then use this information to check if the devices
aremeeting the user’s expectation. Therefore, the current trust
score of the devices is evaluated and compared to the expected
trust level. The trust score is evaluated using the proposed
trust assessment system which consists of the Terms of Use
(TERMS), where the properties and capabilities of a device
designed by its manufacturer are specified. Deviations and
reports are also part of the trust assessment system where the
first one defines the behaviors that do not follow the TERMS
and the second one is the behavior feedback monitoring done
by network controllers of devices. All these three elements
(with crowd-sources nature) are stored in the blockchain and
used to compute the trust scores of devices based on observed
behavior history. The authors also introduce an analyzer ele-
ment as a local trust assessment entity in home networks
believing that global trust assessments are not suitable in
environments with different policies and security or privacy
requirements. The analyzers are used to analyze the data from
the blockchain and to do based on this information the trust
evaluation for the devices.
The existing trust approaches in IoT [10]–[17] summarized
above provide interesting facts regarding the combination of
blockchain and trust to enhance the credibility of services
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in decentralized networks. In this context, IoT environments
where end-users act as service providers removing the need
for centralized, dependable, or specialized entities urge the
consideration of trusted environments enabled by trust man-
agement approaches fulfilling special requirements. Thus,
different aspects of existing trust approaches are considered
in the review by focusing on general, blockchain-based and
trust-based factors which are derived throughout the evalu-
ation or are defined initially based on the special character-
istics and needs of an end-user based and decentralized IoT
service provision approach. The following factors (elements)
are considered in the assessment of existing blockchain-based
trust approaches in IoT.
Initially, the decentralization regarding the IoT environ-
ment, the trust management and the blockchain activities
are highly considered to avoid monopolization, aristocracy,
and other problems arising with centralized approaches.
Besides, the power of end-users is emphasized in the
introduction of this publication and in this context, the
integration of end-users in trust and blockchain activities
is recommended to be also in line with end-user-based
service provision. Another point is the trust incentiviza-
tion in order to motivate peers to participate actively and
trustworthy in different community activities. The incen-
tivization should also include punishments for passive or
not-well behaving activities. Another element considered
in the evaluation is the level of suitability of existing
trust approaches in order to be used for autonomous and
decentralized IoT application provision (ADIoTAP), where
end-users are acting as service providers. Next to them
is the information storage type used in the approaches is
derived. Considered type solutions are centralized or local
storage nodes, Distributed Hash Tables or blockchain-based
ledgers.
Blockchain-based factors start with the trust data storage,
defining whether trust information is stored in the blockchain
(on-chain) or outside (off-chain). Two other important ele-
ments considered are the blockchain type (could be private
or public blockchain) and the blockchain operation mode
(closed - permissioned or open - permissionless). To enable
decision-making in decentralized networks respectively in
blockchain networks and to ensure that all nodes have the
same copy of the ledger, another blockchain feature analyzed
in existing approaches and relevant for decentralized IoT
services is the consensus protocol. Moreover, the consen-
sus should consider the lightweight characteristics of IoT
devices and fog nodes part of the IoT network. Additionally,
an emerging protocol in this context is a smart contract, used
to automate processes based on a contract between partici-
pants without third parties. Therefore, the integration of it
and the smart contract use case (for what it is used in the
approach) are assessed.
The trust score assignment is part of the trust-based aspects
to be reviewed in existing approaches. It consists of whether a
trust approach considers both initial trust scores and ongoing
trust scores or only one of them when evaluating a peer
or application. Next to them, the trust evaluation entity is
responsible to evaluate the trust score of a peer or ser-
vice. This can be done locally or by distributing the task
among nodes. Another trust-based element is the trust model
and its completeness. That means how complex the model
and how many metrics (attributes) does it cover in the
trust evaluation. The trust evaluation of an entity produces
many trust values which need to be aggregated in order to
build the overall trust score of that entity. Therefore, dif-
ferent trust aggregation techniques such as weighted sum,
Bayesian models, fuzzy-based algorithms etc. can be used
for this process. Finally, the trust management approach
should be resilient against different trust attacks performed
by one or many peers in the IoT community (trust attack
resiliency).
The existing approaches use some features of blockchain,
such as the well-known and safe data storage feature using
cryptographic principles. However, they do not benefit from
the whole potential of blockchain techniques by merging
blockchain activities and consensus protocols with trust mod-
els. Moreover, they do not provide a holistic trust model
covering issues of new services and new service providers
in the context of IoT. Next to them, they do not optimize
some blockchain drawbacks such as limitations of existing
consensus methods.
The assessment has also shown that most of the approaches
are using private and closed blockchains focusing more on
nodes controllability rather than in transparency for their
approaches. Additionally, they do not consider the special
nature of end-user made IoT services, where the end-user
probably has less technical knowledge and creates IoT
services without considering standardized service lifecycle
processes. Most of the reviewed approaches are not fully
decentralized by using local super nodes for all activities
without the possibility to contest outcomes of their tasks.
In this context. The trustworthiness of the super nodes is not
considered resulting in low credibility regarding their results.
Their resiliency against trust attacks (such as bad-mouthing
attacks) varies from moderate to low opening the doors for
malicious nodes to harm the system. Only a few of the eval-
uated approaches [12], [13], [15] include reward/punishment
systems in the network to incentivize good behavior among
the nodes. The benefits of process automation and fully
decentralization is also mostly ignored in existing IoT trust
approaches. Only the authors in [12] and [13] use smart
contracts for checking the trust score respectively computing
it. The computation and aggregation of the trust score are
addressed only in [11], [13], [15] by using weighted aver-
age or machine learning techniques in order to get the final
score.
Table 1 shows the outcomes of the evaluation of differ-
ent blockchain-based trust approaches in IoT. The differ-
ent characteristics derived through the assessment of the
approaches concludes with a low suitability level for using
them in end-user based and decentralized IoT service provi-
sion approaches.
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TABLE 1. Assessment of blockchain-based trust approaches in IoT.
III. HOLISTIC TRUST MODEL FOR IOT
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As mentioned in the introduction the end-user together with
its personal environment has high potential to support smart
environments with their own local resources to enhance the
service variety for the community. Thus, this research con-
siders a system model with a completely decentralized IoT
ecosystem [1] shown in Fig. 1.
The IoT ecosystem consists of a decentralized P2P network
with many end-users in the roles of service providers and
service consumers. Every end-user has the ability to manage
(1) IoT devices available in their personal environments to
design/configure easily IoT services themselves. Moreover,
they have the possibility to provide (2) the functionality
of local IoT devices to other end-users as a service. New
services are announced and registered by storing (3) their
service descriptions in the P2P overlay network. Other end-
users can retrieve (4) existing descriptions and subscribe to
a service in order to consume it (5). The whole workflow
is realized without the use of centralized entities (central
service providers) or centralized execution environments for
IoT. Therefore, every end-user can use their own devices
such as routers, smartphones or notebooks as local execution
environments, which also fulfil the hardware requirements to
act as execution systems for service provider activities. The
end-users have also the possibility to cooperate with each
other in order to create a complex IoT service (service com-
position). More details on the decentralized service provision
approach can be found in [1].
The decentralized character of the IoT ecosystem with its
end-users and their personal environments are used in addi-
tion to build a network of trust agents and blockchain nodes
performing various trust activities described in the following
sections.
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST MODEL
To evaluate the trustworthiness in a completely decentralized
IoT community the authors in [18]–[20] propose conception-
ally a comprehensive trust model covering several aspects
where end-users act as decentralized service providers. The
proposed trust model covers aspects such as service func-
tionality, service quality, end-user behavior, end-user task
participation. Fig. 2 shows the trust evaluation layer model
which are further described.
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FIGURE 1. Decentralized IoT Ecosystem.
FIGURE 2. Trust evaluation layer model.
Entity Layer: Every end-user (peer) part of the IoT ecosys-
tem has the possibility to evaluate the trustworthiness of other
end-users acting as service providers.
Evaluation Layer: Three types of trust evaluations are
proposed to be done: evaluation of the services provided
by an end-user; evaluation of the behavior of an end-user;
evaluation of the end-user participation in community tasks.
Metric Layer: The Service Trust Evaluation consists of
several metrics including service testing, service monitoring,
and service rating. The Behavior Trust Evaluation consists
of testing the integrity of service or trust data. The Task
Trust Evaluation consists of checking whether the end-user is
participating in different community activities such as testing
other peers or performing blockchain actions.
Score Layer: The results of the Service Trust Evaluation
will create a component called Service Component Trust
Score, which is combined with the component called Peer
Component Trust Score (derived from behavior and task trust
evaluation) to get the Peer Trust Score of an end-user.
Storage Layer: The computed trust scores are stored in the
blockchain (to enable tamper-proof storage) and Distributed
Hash Tables (DHT) (to enable fast lookup for information).
One key aspect of the holistic trust model is the possibil-
ity to evaluate the trustworthiness of new services or new
end-users joining the IoT community. Several other trust
models in the literature do not consider the initial trust score
of new entities or assign default initial trust scores without
validation or based on related information about entities. The
proposed trust model in this research is integrating service
and performance testing after service deployment in the trust
evaluation process. The tests are done by other community
members and the results are part of the initial trust score
evaluation. This ensures to identify malfunctioning services
from malicious or unexperienced end-users (acting as service
providers) even in the beginning after services are published
to others in the community.
Another important aspect of the holistic trust model is the
way how trust data are managed. The increasing number of
nodes joining and leaving the network and their possible
malicious behavior by removing or changing trust data can
harm the whole system and hide a clear view about the
truth among good nodes. It has pointed out that blockchain
with its cryptographic principles provides a first-class data
integrity feature to store data securely in so-called distributed
ledgers [7], [8]. Thus, the holistic trust model integrates
blockchain for optimizing the storage system and to ensure
tamper-proof trust data (introduced in [6]). Calculated trust
scores and other related trust information are stored in the
blockchain by including the information in transactions,
which need to be validated using so-called consensus meth-
ods. To overcome several limitations of existing methods,
the authors in [19] introduce a Trust-Consensus Protocol,
which considers trust in all steps part of the block creation
cycle such as the block leader selection, the block generation,
and the block validation. The proposed consensus method is
not only used for blockchain activities but also for other parts
of the IoT eco- system such as service provisioning or peer
admission/removal to the IoT community.
C. TRUST METRICS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELS
For each of the trust metrics mentioned in the previous sub-
section (and illustrated in Fig. 2), there are specific trust sub-
metrics defined and used for the trust evaluation. Table 2
shows the different sub-metrics and their respective symbol
used for the mathematical model.
In the following, the different trust metrics and their respec-
tively mathematical model are described.
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TABLE 2. Trust metrics and Sub-Metrics.
Service testing – here the service capabilities including
service functionality and service performance are tested. The
testing occurs for new and existing services and is performed
by other end-users’ part of the IoT community.
1. Functional testing – a service is assigned with a service
description containing information about its functional
behavior. Based on this information other end-users are
able to automatically generate test cases and to perform
functional tests concluding with pass or fail test cases.
The functional testing results are expressed in percentage
of successful test cases. Through performance feature
scaling, a value from 0 – 1 is derived indicating that 0 is
the worst value and 1 the best. The following equation is
used for standard scaling purposes:
s = si −min (si)
max (si)−min (si) (1)
where: s is the normalized value; si non-normalized
value (test result); max (si) is the maximum value;
min (si) minimum value;
Thus, this equation can be transformed for deriving the
score for functional testing:
Sft = Str −min (Str )max (Str )−min (Str ) (2)
where: Sft is normalized score regarding the func-
tional behavior; Str is test result after functional testing;
max (Str ) is the maximum possible test score (equal
to 100); min (Str ) is the minimum possible test score
(equal to 0).
2. Performance testing – same as for the functionality, some
information about the service performance are assigned
in the service description and are going to be tested
by other end-users. An important aspect of performance
testing is accessibility, which includes the response time
(idea adapted from [53], [54]) in comparison to the max-
imal response time (defined in the service description
of the service) and the service acceptance. For response
time the following equation has been defined:
for Sptrt > max(Resptime)
Sptnrt= 1−Sptrt −max
(
Resptime
)
max
(
Resptime
) (3)
for Sptrt < max(Resptime) then S
′
ptrt = 1;
for Sptrt > 2max(Resptime) then S
′
ptrt = 0;
where: Sptnrt is the normalized score regarding response
time of the service; Sptrt is the response time of the
service; max(Resptime) is the maximal response time.
For the service acceptance the following equation has
been defined:
Sptar =
Resppos
Req
(4)
where: Sptar is the score regarding the service accep-
tance; Resppos are the number of positive responses; Req
is the number of requests.
Service monitoring – this is happening continuously dur-
ing the lifetime of a service. The service monitoring is done
by other end-users’ part of the IoT community. Service mon-
itoring includes some metrics from the performance
1. Availability – is the time a service is online from its
starting point and/or the number of online/offline actions
a service is doing (idea adapted from [55]). Following
equation for service online/offline has been defined:
Smtavt = tuptup + tdown (5)
where: Smtavt is the score regarding the service uptime;
tup is the uptime; tdown is the downtime.
For the online/offline actions the following equation has
been defined:
Smtava = NoaMa (6)
where: Smtava is the score regarding the online/offline
actions; Noa is the number of online actions; Ma are the
monitoring actions.
2. Activity – consists of the number of times a service is
used by others for a predefined period and the number
of positive responses (idea adapted from [53], [54]) han-
dled by the service. The following equation is about the
number of times a service is used:
for Nsa < Nsaaver
Smtacn =
Nsa
tmon
Nsaaver
tmonav
(7)
for Nsa > Nsaaver then Smtacn = 1;
where: Smtacn is the score regarding the usability of a
service; Nsa is the number of service utilizations; Nsaaver
is the average number of service utilizations; tmon is
the monitoring time period of the service, tmonav is the
average monitoring time period of services.
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Moreover, this is the equation for number of positive
responses handled by a service:
Smtar =
Resppos
Req
(8)
where: Smtar is the score regarding the service accep-
tance; Resppos are the number of positive responses; Req
are the number of requests.
Service rating - other end-users have the possibility to rate
a service based on their own experience. This can be done
by expressing the service satisfaction Sratsat (using 0 for not
satisfied and 1 for satisfied. Another metric is the number of
successful interactions (idea adapted from [54]) between a
service provider and service consumer. The equation is:
Sratint = IsucItot (9)
where: Sratint is the score regarding the service interactions;
Isuc is the number of successful interactions; Itot is the total
number of interactions
Peer Task Participation – here the effort of end-users
for participating in different community tasks is measured.
In this context, the participation as a test agent for testing
and evaluating other end-users and services is considered.
Moreover, the participation in blockchain tasks is also part
of this metric. In the following the equation for Peer Task
Participation is shown:
Stp =
Ntp
tmont
Ntpaver
tmontav
(10)
where: Stp is the score for participation in tasks; Ntp is the
number of tasks done; Ntpaver is the average number of aver-
age tasks done; tmont is the monitoring time period of a task;
tmontav is the average monitoring time period of tasks.
Peer Integrity Checking – considers checking the
integrity of service and trust data by comparing information in
the P2P overlay and the blockchain. Therefore, the following
equation:
Sinch = McorrCtot (11)
where: Sinch is the score for service integrity; Mcorr are the
correct matches; Ctot is the total number of checks.
D. TRUST IN THE LOOP FOR TRUST OPTIMIZATION
The trustworthiness of the participants in the IoT community
is continuously evaluated. The evaluation will pick out mali-
cious nodes with a low trust score tending to exhibit malicious
behavior. Previously, the authors in [20] proposed to punish
untrustworthy peers being able to provide or use services
and by banning them out the IoT community using smart
contracts. Besides them, to increase the overall security and to
benefit from local resources of every node, it is recommended
to incentivize peers with a low trust score from the network
to boost up their trust score by changing to cooperative and
good behavior. Therefore, this publication proposes to use the
benefits of the holistic trust model, the blockchain, the trust
consensus protocol by integrating them in a control loop
with feedback functionality. In the context of control loops,
the authors in [23], [24] introduce a new concept called User
in the Loop (UIL), where the user is part of a control loop
and motivated to change the location in order to optimize the
signal to interference noise ratio inwireless cellular networks.
The basic idea here is to incentivize or motivate the user
towards a specific behavior. Afterwards, the behavior is ana-
lyzed and based on that the end-user is accordingly informed.
This publication proposes to integrate the UIL concept to
the trust paradigm, which is a completely different applica-
tion field in comparison with the initial usage of this concept
in [23], [24]. The proposed control loop is called Trust in the
Loop (TIL) and is shown in Fig. 3. The control loop contains
a target trust score which has to be achieved by the service
provider and the service it is providing. To do so, the Trust
Unit will look-up in the blockchain for the current trust score
of the ser- vice provider or its service. The current trust score
is compared with the target score and if it is below, the Trust
Unit will set incentives (e.g. discounts for using other services
or more responsibilities for community tasks to increase own
trust score) for the service provider. These incentives cou-
pled with relevant service information are sent to the service
provider. The service provider then decides whether or not to
provide a better service in order to get the benefits promised
by the Trust Unit. The outcome of the revised service is the
service behavior which will trigger the initiation of a new
trust evaluation of the service provider and the service in a
feedback loop. The TIL concept can also be applied to service
providers or to other relevant tasks in the IoT community.
Moreover, it can be used by a service consumer who wants
to use a specific rare service (no other alternatives) which has
currently a low trust score. The activities of the trust loop are
realized completely autonomously through smart contracts.
Smart contracts as self-executed codes stored in blockchains
and enabling untrustworthy intermediations between entities
are very powerful in order to automate processes in a fully
decentralized network (originated in [21], [22]).
FIGURE 3. Trust in the loop.
IV. TRUST EVALUATION AND AGGREGATION IN
DECENTRALIZED COMMUNITIES
A. TRUST EVALUATION AND INFORMATION STORAGE
The authors in [18]–[20] propose a completely decentralized
trust evaluation system, where every end-user part of the
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community can act as a trust agent by performing trust activ-
ities described in section II. As mentioned in [6] evaluated
trust scores are stored in the blockchain to secure the integrity
of the data. This publication describes the trust score storage
in the blockchain more in detail and how trust is evaluated
and aggregated.
First, every end-user evaluates the partial trust score of
another service or peer by using one of the defined trust
metrics in section III. Afterwards, the evaluated trust score
is sent to the blockchain by including the trust information
in a transaction. This transaction has initially an unconfirmed
status and is waiting to be added to the blockchain. Over time,
many transactions are part of the pool of unconfirmed trans-
actions and are containing trust information about different
peers and services. Other end-users can use this information
to aggregate an overall trust score of the service or peer (by
creating a list of transactions for a specific entity which has
to be evaluated). Therefore, the collected trust scores are used
to create an overall trust score using a dynamic weighting
system (described in section V) for every trust metric part of
the calculation. Thus, the current overall trust score of a peer
or service is evaluated from a peer part of the IoT community,
which is selected randomly based on its trust score as a block
creator to create the new block (using the Trust-Consensus
Protocol [19]). Other peers will receive the newly created
block and will have the possibility to check if the block is
created correctly. This means that the transactions included in
the block are correct, only trusted transactions are considered,
trusted block creator etc. The trust score evaluation can be
done in predefined timeslots (time-driven) or when a specific
number of transactions is reached (event-driven). In cases
when a service consumer wants to know the current trust
score of a service, a trust score request (using smart contracts)
is needed to initiate the trust score evaluation (which triggers
the trust evaluation cycle described above).
B. INITIAL TRUST SCORE FOR NEW IOT SERVICES
To evaluate the trustworthiness of new peers or new ser-
vices provided to the IoT community it was proposed to
evaluate the functional behavior and the performance of a
service based on the information provided by the service
provider [18]–[20]. It can be distinguished between new IoT
services provided by a new service provider (peer) or new
IoT service provided by an existing service provider (peer).
For a new service provided by a new peer, as mentioned,
the functional behavior and the performance of the service
are considered. The weighting of the two sub-metrics is set
based on their importance (further on argued). The functional
behavior respectively the functionality of a service has the
highest importance. That means if a service does not work the
performance will not play a big role for the service consumer.
However, if the service works well, then the performance can
affect the satisfaction of the consumer. Thus, the weighting
score for service testing is set as µst = 0.7 and for perfor-
mance testingµst = 0.3. The reasonwhy performance testing
is considered in the weighting is that it could be that a service
is partially working or e.g. 90% of the functionality is work-
ing correctly. The following equations show the calculation
of the initial trust score for a new IoT service provided by a
new peer:
T npinit = µstSst + µptSpt (12)
where: T npinit is the initial trust score of a new service provided
by a new peer; Sst is the score for service testing; Spt is the
score for performance testing.
For new services provided by existing peers, the overall
trust score of the peer is also considered in the trust evalua-
tion. The weighting is here assigned as follow: µst= 0.6 for
service testing; µst= 0.2 for performance testing; µet= 0.2
for the existing trust score of the service provider. Thus,
the following equation for trust evaluation can be presented:
T epinit = µstSst + µptSpt + µetPet (13)
where: T epinit is the initial trust score of a new service provided
by an existing peer; Pet is the trust score of the existing peer.
C. TRUST AGGREGATION SCHEME WITH EFFICIENT
WEIGHTING SYSTEM
The evaluation results of the different trust metrics defined
in the previous section need to be aggregated to an overall
trust score of the end-user (represented as a peer and acting
as a service provider). As mentioned, the overall trust score
consists of the scores derived from service testing, service
monitoring, service rating, peer integrity checking and peer
task evaluation. Thus, it is important to assign a weighting
system for the different trust metrics as they have a different
impact under different conditions on the overall trust score
of a service or service provider. Therefore, this publication
proposes to combine different aspects in order to present
a dynamic weighting system which enables efficient trust
aggregation and automatically weighting adjustment based
on the current situation in the community.
In the following the steps for trust evaluation, trust weight-
ing, and trust aggregation are described:
1. Every peer in the IoT community also behaves as a
test agent performing test activities and trust activities.
Moreover, every peer part of the blockchain is able to
participate actively in blockchain activities.
2. Peers continuously act as test agents and perform the
above-mentioned tests regarding the trust evaluation.
The test results are sent as blockchain transactions to the
blockchain in order to be stored tamper-proofed in the
blockchain.
3. One peer is selected using the Trust-Consensus Pro-
tocol as the Block Creator (in Bitcoin called Miner)
and starts collecting unconfirmed transactions from the
transactions pool in order to form a block. In the col-
lection/selection phase the block creator considers only
transactions from peers with average or high trust score.
Other transactions are not considered (sorted out) – this
ensures that malicious or untrustworthy peers cannot
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impact the trust management system and thus many
attacks are mitigated.
4. Before forming the block, the block creator sorts the
filtered transactions based on the trust metric category
and starts some calculations. This includes the weighted
average trust score for a specific trust sub-metric (for
instance, the block creator collects three transactions
consisting with information about the service testing
score. Therefore, the average of these three values are
calculated). Moreover, the block creator looks up for
the trust score of the originator of the transaction in
order to consider it also in the trust calculation. This
process is done for all other trust sub-metrics. In the end,
the block creator will have a list of parameters which
will be considered for the next steps of the total trust
score computation. The following equation shows the
above-described process:
Swrx =
∑n
i=1 TpiSXi∑n
i=1 Tpi
(14)
where: Swrx is the weighted service trust score for a trust
sub-metric; Tpi is the trust score of the peer who has
evaluated the service; SXi the trust score assigned by the
peer for the specific trust sub-metric (see Table 1).
5. Another point which has to be considered in the prepara-
tion of the trust parameters is the number of tests which
are done in a round for a specific trust sub-metric (it
could be that service testing is done three times and
service rating only one time). Therefore, the following
equation is used:
Swunt =
∑
nSxSx∑
nSx
(15)
where: Swunt is the weighted service trust score for the
service/peer metrics based on the trust score of each of
the considered sub-metrics and their frequency; nSx is the
number of inputs for a specific sub-metric; Sx is the score
for the specific sub-metric (mentioned above).
6. The next step is to rank the different parameters from
the worst to the best value. According to this rank-
ing, the weighting to the parameters is assigned. This
paper argues that parameters with a bad value should be
weighted higher in order to motivate service providers
in future rounds to provide better services and to partici-
pate actively and positively in community activities. The
weighting is done adaptively, that means that every round
(every new block and new calculation of the overall
trust score) the ranking is done and according to that
the weighting is adjusted. A future step could be to
include also the trust score of the block creator in the trust
evaluation process. Therefore, the following equations
are used for ranking the trust parameters (are illustrated
with the metric Service Testing):
Srktest = 1− S test (16)
α = S
rk
test
Srktest + Srkmont + Srkrat + Srkinch + Srktp
(17)
where: SrktestS
rk
montS
rk
ratS
rk
inch,S
rk
tp are the ranking values for
the metrics Service Testing Stest , Service Monitoring
Smont , Service Rating, Peer Integrity Che- cking, Peer
Task Participation; α is the weighting parameter for the
metric Stest .
Similar calculations are also done for the other weighting
parameters: β (for the metric Smont ); γ (for the metric
Srat ); δ(for the metric Sinch); ε(for the metric Stp).
7. The overall current trust score of a peer is computed by
considering all derived scores from the different trust
metrics (and calculated in the previous steps) weighted
with the corresponding weighting parameters derived in
step 6. The following equation shows the calculation
process:
T curtotal=αS test+βSmont+γ Srat + δS inch + εS tp (18)
where: T curtotal is the current total trust score of a peer; α,
β, γ , δ, ε are the weighting coefficients for the different
metrics.
8. To compute the overall trust score, the current one should
also be combined with the old one. Therefore, both
scores are weighted according to the average peer trust
score of each block (last block and current block). The
following equation expresses the overall trust score of a
peer:
Ttotal= 1n
n∑
i=1
T oldpi ×T oldtotal+
1
m
m∑
i=1
T curpi ×T curtotal (19)
where: Ttotal is the overall trust score of a peer; T oldpi is
the average peer trust score of the last block; T curpi is the
average peer trust score of the current block; T oldtotal is the
previous trust score of a peer.
The presented steps for trust evaluation consider a
hybrid dynamic (and adaptive) weighting including different
weighting aspects in the overall system and enabling trust
self-optimization in the whole community.
V. EVALUATION OF THE TRUST MODEL
The previous sections have introduced a comprehensive trust
model with its metrics and calculation principles. The pro-
posed novel trust model with its different characteristics,
starting from the initial trust score considerations, the dif-
ferent trust metrics, the trustworthy consensus protocol,
the trust aggregation concept, and the synergy of blockchain,
smart contracts and trust, fulfils all the requirements defined
in section 2 (under which other trust approaches are also
assessed). This section shows the reliability and resiliency of
the proposed trust evaluation system by performing different
experiments as shown in the following.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
The evaluation of the presented trust evaluation system con-
sists of different defined experiments and scenarios simulated
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under the same general conditions. Ten to fifty transactions
per block are conducted where each transaction consists of
values regarding the different sub-metrics evaluated by dif-
ferent peers. Moreover, five to ten blockchain circles are
executed consisting of five to ten blocks where each block
consists of the overall computed trust score of the peer.
Experiments comprising the following elements and scenar-
ios are realized: Increasing malicious population (nodes pro-
viding false trust information); Impact and evolution of initial
trust scores; Static vs. dynamic weighting; Bad-Mouthing
Attack (malicious nodes providing bad recommendations to
good nodes) [2]; Ballot-Stuffing Attack (malicious nodes
providing good recommendations to bad nodes) [2]; Com-
parative analysis with other existing trust models. More-
over, the experiments include scenarios where all peers are
trustworthy (trust score is above equal to 0.5) and scenarios
where the percentage of malicious peers trying to manipulate
the overall trust score of the evaluated peer sending false
trust scores vary from 20% to 80%. Throughout the experi-
ments, the initial trust score capability of the introduced trust
model with other approaches providing only default values
or no initial trust scores is compared. Moreover, the intro-
duced dynamic weighting system is compared against other
approaches with no or static weighting. To highlight the
resiliency of the proposed trust model, a comparison with
other simple trust models is done to identify the performance
differences of both when being attacked by other nodes under
increasing malicious population. Finally, a relative trust score
is derived and used to assess the accuracy of the proposed
trust model in comparisonwith existing ones in a comparative
analysis.
B. EXPERIMENT 1: IMPACT OF INITIAL TRUST SCORE ON
TRUST EVOLUTION
As evaluated in section 2, none of the existing trust
approaches is providing a considerable solution for initial
trust scores of new services. Most of them are assigning
default values or considering only experience values for the
start. This subsection shows the evolution of the trust score
when using the proposed trust model and its initial trust score
strategy in relation to existing approaches.
In this experiment, there is a service provider (peer) which
has a good trust score (0.8) and provides five services with
good performance. At a moment, five new services are added
by the service provider and the evolution of its trust score
is analyzed when considering the proposed trust approach
and two other approaches (with default initial trust score
of 0.5 and without initial trust score). Moreover, the perfor-
mance of the new services is considered bad throughout their
lifetime (trust score 0.2). It is also assumed that the existing
services are slightly decreasing their trust performance (from
0.8 to 0.55) throughout the block cycles.
The outcome of the simulation (see Fig. 4) shows the
evolution of the trust scorewhen the peer is tending tomove to
a malicious node by providing bad services. The initial trust
score consideration and evaluation using the proposed trust
FIGURE 4. Trust evolution with new services (good to bad).
model enables quick identification of malicious or untrust-
worthy behavior in comparison to existing methods. This
supports other peers acting as service consumers in their
decisions whether or not to use services from the service
provider. This provides better reaction times inmitigating bad
nodes (with initial good scores) to participate in community
tasks, such as in blockchain activities considering also the
Trust-Consensus Protocol.
C. EXPERIMENT 2: STATIC VS. DYNAMIC WEIGHTING
The proposed trust model includes a dynamic weighting
system combining different aspects to enable efficient trust
aggregation and automatically weighting adjustment based
on the current situation in the community. The aim of this
experiment is to show the trust evolution when using the pro-
posed dynamic weighting system in comparison with static
and no weighting approaches.
In the first scenario, a service provider offers various good
services where the number of low trust services (up to 60% of
the services) is intentionally increased during different block
cycles (eight). The proposed dynamic weighting will assign
for each service based on the current situation a weight which
will be adapted in future rounds of trust evaluation and aggre-
gation. The static weighting will consider predefined weights
for the services without including their current behavior in
the evaluation. The proposed trust model motivates the peer
to stay active in all steps.
The outcome of this experiment (see Fig. 5) shows that
the changing behavior of the peers is detected faster using
the proposed trust model with its dynamic weighting system.
Using dynamic weighting, bad behavior is identified, and
malicious peers are demotivated to keep up with the same
activities as it leads to a lower trust score (downgrade) and
less acceptance in the community. Moreover, when using
static weighting, due to the fact that the trust weights are
known, the service providers may neglect one or the other
service.
Contrary to the first scenario, the second one consid-
ers the situation where a low trust service provider is pro-
viding bad services (also lower trust scores) and trying to
increase its overall trust score during future block rounds
in order to attack the system by seemingly providing some
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FIGURE 5. Trust evolution – behavior worsening.
FIGURE 6. Trust evolution – behavior improving.
good services. Fig. 6 shows the outcome of the experiment,
where it is illustrated that the trust evolution with dynamic
is increased more slowly than with static or no weighting
approaches. The bad service provider does not have the possi-
bility to boost up its trust score in this way and is demotivated
(considering also the first scenario) to behave passively or bad
in the community.
Similar results are also conducted when applying this
experiment to a service provider providing with just one
service but changing the performance of individual charac-
teristics of that service.
D. EXPERIMENT 3: PROPOSED TRUST MODEL VS. SIMPLE
TRUST MODEL – BAD-MOUTHING ATTACK
This section evaluates the resiliency of the proposed trust
model in comparison to a simple trust model (with basic
average calculations) against malicious nodes in the network
performing bad-mouthing attacks [2], where bad or malicious
nodes provide bad recommendations for good nodes. The
aim of this experiment is to compare the two models with
each other by showing the differences in their performance
and demonstrating the stability of the proposed model against
attacks.
The attacks are run against one service which is provided
by a service provider. The service and the service provider
are considered trustful with good trust scores in the past. The
percentage of the malicious nodes in the network is increased
during the experiment. The malicious nodes are performing
bad-mouthing attacks by trying to decrease the overall trust
score of the service provider. The aim of the experiment is
to identify the changes in the overall trust score of the peer
during different block cycles and under different amount of
bad-mouthing transactions. Moreover, the resiliency differ-
ence between the proposed trust model and a simple trust
model is conducted.
FIGURE 7. Trustworthy peers.
Fig. 7 shows the scenario where all peers participating
in the trust evaluation are good (trust score 0.5 or higher)
which send different trust scores for the evaluated service
and service provider. The outcome of this scenario shows that
using the simple model for trust score evaluation, the overall
trust score of the service provider is slightly better than with
the new proposedmodel. However, the result using the simple
model does not reflect the detailed truth because it fails to
include the trust score of all test agents performing the trust
evaluation in the overall trust weighting.
FIGURE 8. 20% Malicious peers.
Figs. 8-11 consider the existence of malicious nodes (with
trust score 0.2) which sends transactions with low trust scores
about the evaluated service and service provider. These fig-
ures show that with the increasing number of malicious nodes
the resilience of the trust score evaluated decreases using the
simple trust model. Thus, the difference between the trust
scores evaluated using the simple trust model and the new
proposed trust model increases with the increasing number
of malicious nodes. The results also show that the trust score
using the new proposed trust model stays stable with only
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FIGURE 9. 40% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 10. 60% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 11. 80% Malicious peers.
a minor impact in contrast to the evaluations by malicious
nodes.
Fig. 12 shows the trust evolution of the peer versus
the increasing percentage of malicious nodes. The outcome
shows that the proposed trust model provides good resiliency
against attacks even if they increase to an 80% population.
This can be argued by the fact that untrustworthy peers and
services are ignored in the block building process and the
proposed dynamic (adaptive) weighting system.
E. EXPERIMENT 4: PROPOSED TRUST MODEL VS. SIMPLE
TRUST MODEL – BALLOT-STUFFING ATTACK
This section evaluates the resiliency of the proposed trust
model in comparison to a simple trust model (with basic
average calculations) against malicious nodes in the network
FIGURE 12. Trust Evolution in relation to malicious population.
performing ballot-stuffing attacks [2], where bad ormalicious
nodes provide good recommendations for bad nodes.
The attacks are run against one service which is provided
by a service provider. The service and the service provider
have a low trust score with bad trust scores in the past. The
percentage of the malicious nodes in the network is increased
during the experiment. The malicious nodes are performing
ballot-stuff attacks by trying to increase the overall trust
score of the service provider. The aim of the experiment is
to identify the changes in the overall trust score of the peer
during different block cycles and under different amount of
transactions. Moreover, the resiliency difference between the
proposed trust model and a simple trust model is conducted.
Under normal conditions without malicious peers in the
network, the performance of the two models are almost the
same (shown in Fig. 13) but the differences appear when
starting the attacks. Figs. 14-17 show that by increasing the
percentage of malicious nodes, which send good trust scores
for a bad service, the proposed trust protocol stays resilient
with only a slight impact from wrong trust evaluation scores.
In contrast, the simple trust model totally crashes (in terms of
successfully being attacked) by increasing the trust score up
to 100% of its starting trust score (also shown in Fig. 18).
FIGURE 13. Trustworthy peers.
F. EXPERIMENT 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This subsection presents a comparative analysis of
the proposed trust model against other relevant trust
approaches which are theoretically evaluated in section 2:
119974 VOLUME 8, 2020
B. Shala et al.: Blockchain and Trust for Secure, End-User-Based, and Decentralized IoT Service Provision
FIGURE 14. 20% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 15. 40% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 16. 60% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 17. 80% Malicious peers.
BlockTIoT [11], HierSysT [14], TrustChain [13],
SybRet [12], and TArChain [15]. The comparison focuses
on the performance of the different protocols under different
FIGURE 18. Trust evolution in relation to malicious population.
attacks and increasing population of malicious nodes. Ini-
tially, based on the trust average of all evaluated trust models
the relative trust score is defined and used to assess the
reliability of them under malicious conditions.
FIGURE 19. 20% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 20. 40% Malicious peers.
Figs. 19-22 demonstrate the performance of the different
trust models under the bad-mouthing attack for different
block rounds and different malicious population. It can be
seen that the proposed trust model stays quite stable and
resilient throughout different scenarios. The increasing per-
centage of false trust information is ignored by the proposed
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FIGURE 21. 60% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 22. 80% Malicious peers.
trust model due to the fact that evaluation results from untrust-
worthy peers are completely ignored in the block building
process in the IoT community. Moreover, the impact of the
initial trust score enables a true start in the trust-building
process providing overall several advantages besides existing
approaches. Other approaches present limitations in terms
of trust reliability because of uncomplete trust metric lists,
susceptible weighting systems, and/or missing trust entity
considerations. Fig. 23 confirms the trust resiliency of the
proposed trust model in comparison to BlockTIoT [11],
FIGURE 23. Trust evolution in relation to malicious population.
HierSysT [14], TrustChain [13], SybRet [12], and
TArChain [15] under increasing malicious nodes population
in the network. As a result, bad-mouthing attacks, where
nodes try to downrate a good performing node, are almost
mitigated by the proposed trust model.
The results of the ballot-stuff attack performed against
the different trust models are shown in the Figs. 24-27.
Here the malicious nodes are trying to rate up one of their
‘‘friends’’ in order to harm the system. The figures illustrate
FIGURE 24. 20% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 25. 40% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 26. 60% Malicious peers.
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FIGURE 27. 80% Malicious peers.
FIGURE 28. Trust evolution in relation to malicious population.
that the proposed trust model is only slightly impacted by this
attack and the global view about the bad node will remain
untrustworthy throughout the different block rounds. The
trust evolution under increasing malicious population can be
seen in Fig. 28 and demonstrates again the reliability and
stability of the proposed trust model. Most of the existing
trust models are quickly impacted by the attack, giving the
malicious nodes the possibility to change the opinion in the
community, which afterwards leads to further attacks.
The comparative analysis performed in this subsection
demonstrates the high resiliency of the proposed trust model
against different attacks (bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing).
The increasing percentage of malicious nodes in the network
will also have a low impact on the performance of the pro-
posed trust model. Moreover, the different experiments con-
ducted in this section shows the advantages of the proposed
trust model, such as the initial trust score evaluation or the
dynamic weighting system. Next to them, the trust inclu-
siveness in all steps of the trust evaluation process and the
blockchain activities ensures high reliability on the outcomes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to effectively counteract several security and
trust issues present in decentralized IoT communities, this
research proposes to use the powerful attributions derived
from the synergy of blockchain and trust. Therefore, this
paper first presents a comprehensive review of existing
blockchain-based trust approaches and provides information
about their suitability to decentralized IoT communities.
Then, it introduces a holistic trust model which does not
only cover the trust status of existing services or service
providers but also considers the trustworthiness of new join-
ing entities. Single point of failure issues are completely
eliminated by a fully decentralized trust evaluation system.
Furthermore, the community members are motivated to act
in several community tasks through trust competitions. This
research publication also provides detailed information on
the trust metric parameters and presents their mathematical
model used for trust evaluation.Moreover, it introduces a new
trust aggregation scheme comprised of a dynamic weighting
system in order to compute reliable trust scores of the partic-
ipating entities in an IoT community. Through a previously
introduced trust consensus protocol, the trust evaluation and
aggregation steps are highly optimized in terms of trustwor-
thiness and reliability. Only trustworthy peers are allowed to
proceed, create and validate transactions/blocks used for the
different trust processes. Additionally, this paper proposes to
combine blockchain and trust with control loops to introduce
a novel concept which optimizes the security of the ecosystem
by incentivizing low-trust peers to improve their behavior in
the community. Finally, the performance of the trust model is
demonstrated, and different experiments are carried out. The
experimental results show that the proposed trust approach
outperforms in terms of resiliency and reliability in compari-
son with existing ones.
Future works will have a special focus on the
control-loop concept and their possible integration in several
aspects of the decentralized IoT ecosystem. The proposed
blockchain-based trust model can serve as a good basis for
further research on increasing the trustworthiness in IoT net-
works with the incorporation of blockchain. Moreover, it can
be mapped onto other fields such as in VANETs, Flying Ad
Hoc Networks (FANETs) or the Internet of Everything (IoE).
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